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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

NOTES AND COMMENT

WOULD YOU LIKE TO BE ON TELEVISION? DESPITE WILSON V.
LAYNE, IF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS WANT TO BRING
THE MEDIA INTO THE HOME THEY SHOULD JUST ASK

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the recent case of Wilson v. Layne, the Supreme Court decided whether
the Fourth Amendment is violated when law enforcement officials allow the
media to accompany them into a home and document the execution of a
warrant.1 The Court spoke plainly and unanimously by holding that the Fourth
Amendment is violated when law enforcement officials bring members of the
media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant
when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the
execution of the warrant.2 Amidst this seemingly straightforward rule,
however, is a gray area with several important, yet unanswered, questions.
The first and primary question is whether the Fourth Amendment is violated
when the police attempt to obtain the consent of the homeowner for the media
to enter the home.3 If obtaining consent in this situation is not a per se Fourth
Amendment violation, the next question that must be answered is what
1. See Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999). It is important to point out that the latter
half of the Wilson opinion discusses a separate issue. Since the Court had determined the police
had violated a Fourth Amendment right, they subsequently had to analyze whether this was
clearly established at the time of the incident since the Wilsons had sued the officers. Id. at 1696,
1699. Federal officials are entitled to qualified immunity when they are sued by homeowners
alleging Fourth Amendment violations if their actions had not been clearly established as
violative of the Amendment. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). The same standard also applies to state standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1998). The Court
held the officers were protected by qualified immunity since “it was not unreasonable for a police
officer in April 1992 to have believed that bringing media observers along during the execution of
an arrest warrant (even in a home) was lawful.” Id. at 1700. Because the issue is secondary to
the determination that the Fourth Amendment was violated, and is not at all related to consent, it
will not be focused upon in this note.
2. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699.
3. See id.
129
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standard should be used to determine if the consent is valid. Finally, given the
oppressive nature of nearly all executions of search and arrest warrants, it must
be addressed whether a valid consent can exist under any standard.
This Note reviews the Fourth Amendment issues in Wilson and attempts to
provide answers to these questions. Part II of this Note describes Wilson and
identifies other recent appellate decisions addressing similar situations
involving the media accompanying police during warrant executions. Part III
gives an historical background of the Fourth Amendment in general, and as it
has been applied to consent. Part IV of this Note argues that there is no per se
violation of the Fourth Amendment under Wilson when the police obtain a
valid consent for the media to enter the home. Part V argues the standard
measuring the validity of a consent obtained by police for the media to enter
the home must be that standard used to measure the validity of a consent to a
warrantless search by the police. Finally, Part VI argues that though law
enforcement may attempt to obtain consent for the media to enter, given the
oppressive nature of searches and arrests pursuant to a warrant, the consent
will rarely be valid.
II. HISTORY
The Supreme Court recently held the Fourth Amendment is violated when
the police bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during
the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home
was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.4 This opinion was the Court’s
response to a factual scenario that seemed blatantly repulsive to the Fourth
Amendment’s embodiment of principles respecting the privacy of the home.5
Wilson involved federal and local law enforcement officials inviting a
reporter and photographer to accompany them to observe the officials execute
an arrest warrant.6 The warrant did not mention the media’s presence, and the
media was not there to assist the officials in executing the warrant.7 The
officials were attempting to arrest Dominic Wilson who was thought to reside
at the dwelling where the warrant was to be executed.8 It was unknown to the
police, however, that this residence was actually the home of Charles and
Geraldine Wilson, Dominic’s parents.9
At approximately 6:45 a.m., the officers and the media forcefully entered
the home of Charles and Geraldine and proceeded to look for Dominic.10

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See supra text accompanying note 1.
See generally Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1692.
See id. at 1695.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1696.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

WOULD YOU LIKE TO BE ON TELEVISION?

131

Charles, who was still in his bed, ran downstairs to investigate what was
happening and was confronted in his living room by five men in street clothes
with guns.11 The officers believed him to be Dominic Wilson and quickly
restrained him.12 Once the officers learned that Dominic Wilson was not
actually in the house, they released Charles and departed from the scene.13
This, however, was only after the photographer had taken numerous pictures of
the incident and the reporter had observed the confrontation between Charles
and the officials.14
Wilson arose from the Fourth Circuit; however, it was not the first circuit
to address such law enforcement practices.15 The Second Circuit was the first
to hear a media participation case involving the Fourth Amendment.16 In
Ayeni v. Mottola, secret service agents brought a Columbia Broadcast Service
(“CBS”) crew with them to film while the agents executed a search warrant.17
The police were planning to search Babatunde Ayeni’s apartment for evidence
of credit card fraud.18 When the police and camera crew arrived, Babatunde
was not present; however, his wife and young son were.19 The CBS crew
accompanied the agents into the home and subsequently filmed the search of
the home and Mrs. Ayeni and her son.20
The court held that the agents did violate the Fourth Amendment by
bringing the film crew into the home.21 Judge Newman stated his now oft11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari after a split between the circuit courts on the issue of Fourth Amendment violations and
whether the police could receive qualified immunity for any actions the courts deemed violative
of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 118-9; Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997); Parker v.
Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2nd Cir. 1994); see also
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388.
16. See Ayeni, 35 F.3d 680. It is important to note that the courts, prior to Ayeni, had
addressed the media entering the home when accompanied with the police or otherwise.
Challenges to such intrusions, however, were made under tort theories, primarily trespass and
invasion of privacy, and not under the Fourth Amendment. The only Constitutional Amendment
implicated by these cases was the First Amendment. The media typically used this to assert their
justification for entering the home. This subject, and the case law associated with it, will be
discussed more fully later in this note. See infra Part V.
17. Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 683.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 686. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson, the Fourth Circuit also
held that Ayeni’s protection under the Fourth Amendment from an agent bringing persons into
their home not expressly nor impliedly authorized by the warrant was clearly established. Id. In
making this determination, the court relied upon “well-established Fourth Amendment standards”
and 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1988). Id. at 686-7.
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cited phrase “[a] private home is not a soundstage for law enforcement
theatricals.”22 The court also noted the warrant did not authorize the media to
accompany the agents, and the media did not aid the agents in the execution of
the warrant.23 Additionally, the court stated that Mrs. Ayeni had objected to
the film crew’s presence in her home.24 Like Wilson, however, there was no
further discussion on whether the agents could or should have attempted to
obtain valid consent from Mrs. Ayeni in order to side-step any potential Fourth
Amendment violations.
Nearly two years later, the Eighth Circuit addressed this issue in Parker v.
Boyer, and reached quite a different conclusion.25 In Parker, local law
enforcement officers invited a local news station to accompany them to a
home.26 The news crew was there for no other purpose than to observe and
film the officers execute a search warrant for evidence of illegal weapons.27
Once again, the media accompanied the police into a private residence and
filmed the search being conducted.28
Here, the court noted that the homeowner’s permission to videotape the
search was not obtained.29 Furthermore, the court mentioned that the police
department even had a policy requiring the media to obtain permission to
videotape private citizens whose houses were being searched.30 Though the
court focused primarily on immunity, they did state that, with the exception of
Ayeni, most courts have rejected the argument that the United States
Constitution forbids the media to accompany the police to a person’s property
while it is searched.31 Accordingly, the court felt no Fourth Amendment
violations occurred, and therefore, the lack of consent of the homeowner, for
Fourth Amendment purposes, was no longer an issue.

22. Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 683.
25. 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996).
26. Id. at 446.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 447.
29. Id.
30. Parker, 93 F.3d at 447.
31. Id. (citing Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1984); Moncrief v. Hanton, 10
MED. L. RPTR. 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 MED. L. REPTR. 2372 (S.D.
Cal. 1980); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)). The Wilson Court
specifically distinguished these cases stating the cases were decided on “unorthodox non-Fourth
Amendment right to privacy theories.” Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1700. For an interesting discussion
on how the court in Berger distinguished these cases from the factual circumstances in both
Parker and Berger, see infra text accompanying note 39. The court did, however, acknowledge
the decision in Ayeni. Parker, 93 F.3d at 447. The court went on to hold that the law did not
clearly establish Fourth Amendment violations under these circumstances, and therefore, the
officers enjoyed qualified immunity. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit took its turn a year later in Berger v. Hanlon.32 Berger
involved a slightly different factual scenario than the other circuits had
confronted.33 Here, a search warrant was issued authorizing the search of a
ranch for evidence indicating the taking of wildlife.34 Prior to this search, the
government agents had entered into an agreement with Cable News Network
(“CNN”) that allowed CNN to ride along with the police and observe and
record the search.35 The government agent conducting the search was wired
with a hidden microphone, which was transmitting live audio to a CNN
technical crew that was filming the search.36 The agent obtained Mr. Berger’s
consent to enter the house since the warrant only authorized a search of the
outdoor premises.37 Unbeknownst to Mr. Berger, however, was the fact that
the wired agent was recording the entire conversation both inside and outside
the home.38
The court in Berger sided with the Second Circuit by holding that the
Fourth Amendment was violated due to the media’s recordings of the
conversations inside Berger’s home.39 More importantly, for purposes of this
argument, consent was finally recognized as an issue in situations where the
media enter the home with the police.40 Because Mr. Berger’s home was
outside the scope of the search warrant, the court pointed out that although he
consented to the agent entering his home, he did not consent to the
microphone’s entry into his home.41 The media appellees relied on the
“invited informer” theory to support their claim that Berger’s Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated since he consented to the agents entry

32. 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
33. See id.
34. Id. at 508. The officers did not have a search warrant to enter the house. The search
warrant only allowed entry onto the outdoor premises of the ranch. As will later be mentioned,
the officer obtained the consent of the homeowner for the officer’s entry into the home.
35. Berger, 129 F.3d at 509.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The recording of the conversation by CNN revealed to the court that the officer did
obtain consent to enter the home. However, the recording also revealed that no mentioning was
made of the media’s wired entrance into the home. Id.
39. Berger, 129 F.3d at 510-11. The Berger court specifically distinguished the cases relied
upon by the Eighth Circuit in Parker. The court stated that these cases involved media
representatives who were playing a “passive role.” Id. at 512. By “passive role” the court
explained that in those cases the media passively observed for law enforcement purposes. Id.
This, the court stated, was entirely different than taking an active role for strictly entertainment
purposes. Id.
40. Id. at 513.
41. Id.
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into the home.42 The court rejected this theory since the recording was not
done for any law enforcement purpose, but strictly for media entertainment
purposes.43 By holding that Berger had an expectation of privacy in his
conversations with the agent that was infringed by the surreptitious recordings,
the court also implies that had he consented to the recordings there would have
been no expectation of privacy and no Fourth Amendment violation.44
A decision was finally rendered by the Fourth Circuit in Wilson v. Layne in
April of 1998.45 The Fourth Circuit did not address whether the Wilsons’
Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to the media’s presence in their
home.46 For immunity purposes, the court only decided that in April of 1992,
when the incident occurred, there was no clearly established law that the law
enforcement officials violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing the media to
observe the execution of an arrest warrant inside a private home.47 The court
did, however, note the district court’s holding which stated that by allowing the
reporters to enter the Wilsons’ home without their consent, the officers had
violated their constitutional rights.48 Since the Fourth Circuit did not address
the constitutionality of the media’s presence, they also did not analyze the
issue of consent as it pertains to this matter.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A.

The General Application of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable

42. Berger, 129 F.3d at 513. The court noted that the invited informer doctrine was
developed in cases where the government used informants with recording devices to obtain
information for legitimate law enforcement purposes. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 514. The officer’s warrantless entry into the home is initially what brought the
issue of consent to the court’s attention. The officer’s entry alone was seen as non-violative of
the Fourth Amendment since he asked and obtained permission from the homeowner. It was the
“entry” of the media, via the hidden microphone, which was seen as a violation of the
homeowner’s Fourth Amendment rights since no such permission was granted. Therefore,
though the initial issue of consent before the court dealt with a warrantless entry, the implication
remains: this being that regardless of the existence of a warrant authorizing entry, there is no
Fourth Amendment violation if the homeowner consents to the media’s entry.
45. 141 F.3d 111.
46. Id. at 118.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 113-14.
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cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.49

To understand how the Court interpreted these words to protect the Wilsons
from media intrusion during the execution of an arrest warrant, it is necessary
to view the historical notions of the sanctity of the home that pre-date our own
Constitution.
As the Court in Wilson was apt to point out, “the Fourth Amendment
embodies the centuries old principle of respect for the privacy of the home.”50
The roots of this principle can be found deeply embedded in English Common
Law.51 Lord Chatham in a 1763 address to the House of Commons succinctly
declared these ideals in what remains to be a common reference for Fourth
Amendment history:
[t]he poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the
crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all
his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.52

The Framers obviously took such sentiments to heart when creating the Fourth
Amendment.
Though the judiciary has adopted these widely agreed-upon principles, it
has taken a couple hundred years of development for the home to receive the
protection it is given today. The Fourth Amendment does not state, nor has it
been interpreted, that a complete bar exists against government intrusion into
the home. Rather, the Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable”
searches and seizures and requires “probable cause” for the issuance of any
warrants.53 As the Court recently pointed out in California v. Acevedo, this
does not by its terms require a prior warrant for a search.54 Instead, the Fourth
Amendment simply prohibits searches and seizures that are unreasonable.55
The question then is whether a search or seizure without a warrant is
49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697.
51. See Entick v. Carrington & Three Other King’s Messengers, 19 State Tr. 1029 (1765).
This decision is often cited as formulating the underlying principle that their needs to be restraints
on the government’s ability to enter a private home. Entick involved a trespass action where
authorities had entered his home to seize items that could potentially be used to convict the
plaintiff of seditious libel. Id.
52. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 n. 54 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); United
States v. Sansuni, 813 F. Supp. 149, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
54. 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991). Though Acevedo did not involve the search of a home, the
Court spoke very generally of the Fourth Amendment regarding its requirements and protections.
Id. Acevedo involved the warrantless search of a bag within the trunk of an automobile. Id. at
569-70. The Court held that as long as police had probable cause, a warrant is not necessary to
search closed containers in automobiles. Id.
55. Id.
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unreasonable. Regarding entry into the home, our jurisprudence generally
indicates that implicit within the reasonableness requirement is the requirement
that a warrant be issued.56 However, a textual encounter with the Fourth
Amendment reveals that the lack of a warrant does not, by itself, always make
a search or seizure unreasonable.57
There are generally two recognized types of warrants, search warrants and
arrest warrants. As mentioned, a warrant can only be issued upon a showing of
probable cause. For a search warrant, the probable cause must be based on a
reasonable belief that the legitimate object of a search is located in a particular
place.58 For an arrest warrant, the probable cause must be based upon a
reasonable belief that the subject of a warrant has committed the offense.59
The search warrant then protects the individual’s interest in the privacy of the
home, while the arrest warrant protects an individual from an unreasonable
seizure.60 To further this intended protection, there is an additional
requirement of the detached and neutral magistrate.61 Neither a search warrant
nor an arrest warrant is valid unless issued by such an impartial judicial
member.62
It has only been since 1948 that the Supreme Court has recognized the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment implicitly requires the
government to obtain a search warrant to enter one’s home.63 In Johnson, the
Court expressed the Fourth Amendment required more than the reasonable
probable cause inferences made by law enforcement officers.64 Here, the
Court stated that Fourth Amendment protection “consists in requiring that
56. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Payton, 445 U.S. at 573. See also Wilson, 119 S. Ct. 1692, (1999); Buonocore v. Harris,
134 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 1998); Berger, 129 F.3d at 505; Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 680.
57. U.S. CONST. amend IV. As will be explained later, the Court has made this same textual
interpretation by carving out several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including consent.
See infra Part IV.
58. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1981); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
59. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 212.
60. Id.
61. See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 10, infra notes 63-65; Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S.
319 (1979). Lo-Ji involved the search of an adult bookstore where the magistrate issuing the
warrant also participated in the search. The Court stated “[t]he Town Justice did not manifest that
neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer when presented with a warrant
application for a search and seizure.” Lo-Ji, 442 U.S. at 326. See also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
62. See cases cited supra note 61.
63. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 10. Here, the police smelled burning opium in the hallway of a
hotel after receiving information from an informant that opium was, in fact, being smoked in the
room. Id. The officer knocked on the door and stated, “I want to talk to you a little bit.” Id. at
12. Once the resident opened the door, the officer, without a warrant or obtaining consent,
entered the room. Id.
64. Id. at 14.
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those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.”65 This reasoning was later expressed in Katz v. United
States, where the Court held that searches conducted outside the judicial
process without prior approval by a judge or magistrate are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.66 The Court did explain, however,
that this per se rule was subject to a few “specifically established and welldelineated” exceptions.67
The Supreme Court has equally recognized the importance of the home
when arrests are being made.68 In 1980, in Payton v. New York, the Court held
that absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, the police cannot enter a private
residence to make an arrest.69 This has particular importance in Wilson since
the police were entering a house with an arrest warrant and not a search
warrant. Citing to Payton, the Court in Wilson noted that they were convinced
of “overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in
our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”70 Such statements indicate
that the Court continues to provide the home with an added level of protection
from intrusion by law enforcement.
B.

Application of the Fourth Amendment in Wilson

Using this Fourth Amendment history and jurisprudence, the Wilson Court
formulated a holding precluding the police from bringing members of the
media or other third parties along when the presence of those third parties in

65. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14. As supra note 63 mentions, the officer entered the room
without consent. Here the Court stated that entry into the defendant’s living quarters “was
granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a
constitutional right.” Id. at 13. Though not setting out the specific exception of consent, this is
the closest the Supreme Court came to reaching such a decision prior to Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Johnson also alludes to the coercive atmosphere that can be
created by an officer’s actions and the potential invalidity of an alleged consent. Johnson¸ 333
U.S. at 515-16. This will be discussed further under the analysis section of this note. See infra
Part IV.
66. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. The police wire-tapped a public phone booth in an attempt to
listen to a man make illegal phone calls. Id. at 348-49. Katz set out a two-pronged test to
determine when a “search” has occurred. Id. at 350-52. The Court determined that when the
police violate 1) a reasonable expectation of privacy, that 2) society is willing to accept, then a
Fourth Amendment search has occurred. Id.
67. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. As will be discussed later, consent has evolved into one of these
specific and well-delineated exceptions. See infra Part IV.
68. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 573.
69. Id at 583. After establishing probable cause that Payton had committed murder, police
officers showed up at his home intending to make an arrest. Id. The officers knocked on the
door, and after no one answered they entered the home and conducted a search. Id.
70. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 603-04).
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the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.71 In making this
determination, the Court relied heavily on their earlier decision in Horton v.
California.72 There, the Court held that if the scope of a search exceeds that
permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the
relevant exception from the warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is
unconstitutional without more.73 The Court further reasoned that “the Fourth
Amendment does require that police actions in execution of a warrant be
related to the objectives of the authorized intrusions.”74
At this point the Wilson Court simply applied this reasoning to the facts
surrounding the case. The arrest warrant the police were executing did not
contain any information regarding the media accompanying the police.75
Furthermore, the media representatives who entered the Wilson home did not
assist the police in any form to execute the warrant.76 The media’s purpose for
being in the home was, therefore, not related to the justification the police had
to enter the home.77 The arrest warrant authorized the apprehension of
Dominic Wilson.78 It did not authorize the observation and recording of the
incident.79 Therefore, “the presence of the reporters inside the home was not
related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion.”80
The respondents took the position that it should be in the police’s
discretion to determine if the presence of the media serves a legitimate law
enforcement purpose.81 They further argued that a legitimate law enforcement
purpose was served since the media’s observation allows the public to view the
law enforcement’s efforts in fighting crime and in protecting against police
abuses.82 The Court, however, soundly rejected these arguments stating that
the legitimate law enforcement purposes of which the respondents spoke were
71. Id. at 1699. Without engaging in an argument that is outside the scope of this note, it is
assumed the Court’s holding refers to both search and arrest warrants. Though the facts of this
case are primarily concerned with the entry into a house based on an arrest warrant, the holding
speaks of warrants in general terms. There is no indication in the holding or the Court’s analysis
that their decision only applies to situations involving arrest warrants.
72. 496 U.S. 128 (1990); see also Wilson¸ 119 S. Ct. at 1697.
73. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697.
74. Id. at 1698 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison,
480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987)).
75. Wilson¸ 119 S. Ct. at 1695.
76. Id. at 1698.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1695.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1698.
81. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1698. Interestingly, the Court did not reference their own prior
decision of Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), when responding to this contention.
Andresen specifically states that “nothing [should be] left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant.” Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480.
82. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1698-99.
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too general to trump the Fourth Amendment.83 In other words, the general
purpose of publicizing law enforcement activities is not sufficiently related to
the specific purpose in the warrant, that of apprehending Dominic Wilson. The
Court stated, “the possibility of good public relations for the police is simply
not enough, standing alone, to justify the ride-along intrusion into a private
home.”84 This dicta seems not only controlling for law enforcement but for
judges and magistrates issuing warrants as well. Though the Court specifically
points out that Dominic’s warrant did not authorize the media’s presence, the
Court seems to indicate that even if a warrant permitted the media to
accompany the police for “ride-along” purposes, such a warrant would be
invalid.85
C. The Fourth Amendment As Applied to Consent
As previously mentioned, the Fourth Amendment does not say that a
search or seizure is unreasonable absent a warrant.86 Rather the demand of the
Fourth Amendment is that any search conducted must be reasonable.87
Though this has been interpreted to mean that a search of or entry into a home
can only be reasonable if conducted pursuant to a warrant, the Court has set
forth several exceptions.88 One of the most widely used and recognized
exceptions to this rule is the valid consent of a person for the police to enter
and search their home.89
The issue of consent was addressed by the Supreme Court in 1972 in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.90 Though that case deals with the search of an
83. Id. at 1699.
84. Id. at 1698.
85. Id. at 1698-99. It is not the intention of this analysis to further explore the issue of
whether the Court is indicating that warrants should not be issued that allow media intrusion into
the home for non-policing objectives.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
87. Id.
88. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 35. See also Payton, 445 U.S. at 603 (suggesting that the amount
of time that has elapsed bears on whether exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless
search); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1990) (holding that the gravity of the crime
and the risk of danger to establish probable cause must be assessed to determine if exigent
circumstances exist to justify a warrantless search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767-68
(1969) (holding that a warrantless search of a home incident to a lawful arrest is constitutionally
justified).
89. 26 AM. JUR. 2D POF §465 (1981).
90. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Schneckloth, officers on routine patrol stopped a vehicle after
observing a headlight and license plate light were not functioning. Id. at 220. The officer asked
the passenger if he could search the car and the passenger replied that he could. Id. The officers
then asked “Does the trunk open?” Id. The driver responded that it did and went and obtained the
keys and opened the trunk. Id. In the trunk, the police discovered three stolen checks. Id. The
Court held that the consent to search the truck was not valid because it was not voluntarily given.
Id. at 249.
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automobile, Schneckloth sets forth the basic rules of when a warrantless search
conducted pursuant to a consent is permissible.91 The Court essentially stated
that unless consent was freely and voluntarily given, it would be considered
invalid.92 A search or entry into a home pursuant to an invalid consent would,
therefore, be deemed as violative of the would-be consenter’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
Though the Court sets forth some definitive guidelines in measuring the
validity of consent, issues of consent have been dealt with by the Court long
before Schneckloth. For example, in 1948 in the already mentioned case of
Johnson v. United States, officers entered the private residence of a woman
without a warrant of any kind.93 The officers gained entrance by knocking on
the door and telling the lady they wished to speak with her.94 The officers
claimed the woman then let them enter the room.95 The Court noted, however,
that the officers’ entrance was “granted in submission to authority rather than
an understanding and waiver of a constitutional right.”96
In 1967 in Katz v. United States, the Court again addressed consent and
recognized that a search authorized by consent is wholly valid.97 It was not
until the next year, however, in Bumper v. State of North Carolina, that the
Court spoke more fully on consent and its requirement that it be freely and
voluntarily given: “[w]hen a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify
the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was,
in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by
showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.”98
This decision is more relevant to Wilson and this note since it involves the
warrantless search of a home and the potentially coercive atmosphere law
enforcement officers can create.99 Bumper involved a 66 year-old black
woman being confronted by four white law enforcement officers at her front
door stating that they had a search warrant.100 Without questioning the
officers, the woman let them in to search the house.101 The Court held that her

91. Id.
92. Id. at 249.
93. See supra notes 63, 65.
94. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 12.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 13. It is indicated in Schneckloth, however, that there need not be an
understanding by the consenter that he or she is waiving a constitutional right. Schneckloth, 412
U.S. at 234.
97. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-58 (citing Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946)). For a
description of the facts surrounding Katz, see supra note 66.
98. 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).
99. See id.
100. Id. at 546.
101. Id.
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Fourth Amendment rights were violated since her consent was not freely and
voluntarily given.102
As the Court also sets out in Schneckloth, the exception of consent to the
warrant and probable cause requirements had also been established in Davis v.
United States and Zap v. United States.103 The Court in Schneckloth, therefore,
accepted that a voluntary consent is constitutionally valid.104 The Court then
had the arduous task of defining and articulating a definition of “voluntary,”
and setting forth guidelines that help determine whether this definition has
been satisfied.
The test the Court espoused to make this determination was to examine
whether the consent was “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker.”105 Having no prior decisions addressing this test in
Fourth Amendment contexts, the Court adopted their “traditional definition of
voluntariness.”106 This definitional approach relied on the Court’s decisions
determining the voluntariness of defendants’ confessions for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment.107 This subject had been addressed by the Court
nearly 40 years earlier in Brown v. Mississippi, where it was held that criminal
convictions based upon confessions obtained by brutality and violence are
constitutionally invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.108 In other words, the Court was going to examine whether or
not the consent was coerced.109
To determine if a confession had been coerced, the Court adopted a totality
of the circumstances approach.110 Characteristics of the accused, such as age
and intelligence, and details of the interrogation have all been taken into
account.111 The Court in Schneckloth then decided that all the surrounding
circumstances should be taken into account to determine if a consent has been
coerced.112 The Court specifically stated it would examine subtly coercive
consent questions and the vulnerable subjective state of the person who
consents.113 Schneckloth does not contend, however, that the person must be

102. Id. at 550.
103. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233; see also authority cited supra note 97.
104. Id. at 227-30.
105. Id. at 225.
106. Id. at 223
107. Id.
108. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
109. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229.
110. Id. at 226, 229-30.
111. Id. at 226 (citing Haley v. Ohio 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (regarding age); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958) (regarding lack of education); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957)
(regarding low intelligence)).
112. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229.
113. Id.
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aware of their right not to consent, but did acknowledge that this would be a
factor considered in the examination of all the surrounding circumstances.114
Both before and after Schneckloth, the Court, in a variety of decisions in
varying circumstances, has refined and expanded the factors considered in
determining whether a consent has been voluntarily given. For instance, the
Court has looked at whether the police made any claim of authority prior to
obtaining consent.115 When consent is given to enter the home only after the
officers have asserted they have a warrant, the consent is typically considered
invalid.116 Likewise, if the police threaten to obtain a warrant if the suspect
does not acquiesce to the police’s request to enter or search a home, the threat
has been viewed as coercive unless the police have valid grounds to obtain a
Similarly, a show of force or other inherently coercive
warrant.117
circumstances can make a consent invalid.118 As indicated in Bumper, a large
number of officers waiting on one’s doorstep can potentially create this
coercive atmosphere.119 These factors not only consider the actions of the
police, but also the situation and actions of the person consenting. For
example, the age, intelligence, and mental state of the person consenting has
been considered extremely relevant in testing the validity of a “voluntary”
consent.120 The Court has reasoned that immaturity and minimal education
carries with it a higher degree of impressionability.121 Therefore, a more
impressionable person will be more likely to submit to an officer’s request to

114. Id. at 249.
115. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 543. As mentioned earlier, the Court felt that the presence of
four white officers and their assertion that they were going to search the house constituted a claim
of authority that contributed to a coercive atmosphere. This factor will become of particular
importance when examining whether the police, when executing a search or arrest warrant, can
obtain consent for media to enter the home. Though Bumper involves the police claiming they
had a warrant that did not exist, the Court heavily scrutinized the inherently coercive atmosphere
created by four uniformed white police officers at the door step of an elderly black woman’s
home. Id. As will later be discussed, this type of coercive atmosphere seems to also be created in
situations such as Wilson, where a homeowner encounters several agents in his home late at night.
Even if the media had remained outside the home, until given permission to enter, the question
remains as to whether it would have been possible for the police to obtain a valid consent in this
context.
116. Id.
117. United States v. Evans, 27 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v.
White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 1992)). In White, the court stated “[w]hen the expressed
intention to obtain a warrant is genuine. . . and not merely a pretext to induce submission, it does
not vitiate consent.” White, 979 F.2d at 542.
118. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 546, 555.
119. Id. The converse result using this reasoning, however, seems to imply that a person
being confronted by law enforcement at his or her home, as opposed to a dark, rural road, can be
considered as diluting, to some degree, the coercive atmosphere that has been created.
120. See supra note 111.
121. Id.
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enter the home or conduct a search. To the contrary, a criminal defense
attorney is more likely to resist police requests to search when a warrant does
not exist. This rationale can also potentially apply to intoxicated persons.122
Regardless of the person’s intellect, age, etc., the fact the person is not aware
he or she is waiving a constitutional right by consenting is only one factor to be
considered and is not determinative on whether a consent was voluntary.123
The Court has also held that when a person expresses a denial of guilt to
the police, even if consent is obtained, the consent may not be valid.124 On the
other hand, a lower court noted that a valid confession of guilt prior to the
search would tend to weigh in favor of a valid consent.125 Once again, the
existence of any single factor does not necessarily make a consent per se
invalid. Instead, consent is examined in light of all the surrounding
circumstances.
Consent, as it pertains to warrantless entries into a home, has received very
little judicial attention. Unfortunately, the judiciary has focused even less on
consent as it pertains to the media accompanying the police inside a home,
where the police’s entry is justified by a warrant. The law on this issue is
virtually undeveloped. The Supreme Court’s first decision focusing on the
media entering with the police into a private residence did not at all address the
issue of consent.126 Even the circuit courts have remained relatively silent on
this subject.127 The subject still seems to be undergoing development in the
state and federal district courts. Reliance on these lower court interpretations
is, therefore, necessary.
Traditionally courts did not analyze the media’s entrance into a home, with
or without the police, in the context of the Fourth Amendment.128 Rather, the
First Amendment was often cited and examined since media representatives
would typically argue that they had a First Amendment right to enter the home

122. United States v. Leland, 376 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1974). Here the Court considered
whether the defendant was so intoxicated that his consent to a search of his automobile was not
the result of a rational intellect. Though it was determined that he was able to make a valid,
uncoerced consent, the court demonstrated their willingness to take this factor into consideration
when determining whether a consent has been freely and voluntarily given.
123. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27.
124. Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
125. See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
126. See generally Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1692.
127. See cases cited supra notes 25, 30 - 32. See also supra text accompanying notes 39, 42,
44. It seems the Fourth Circuit decision in Berger (addressing that there was no consent to bring
in the microphone) and Eighth Circuit decision in Parker (discussing the department’s policy to
obtain consent of the homeowner before allowing the media into the home) are the only circuit
court opinions addressing the issue of consent in this context. Id.
128. See A.A. Dietmann v. Time, Inc. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149;
Florida Publ’g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1976); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441
N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
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and observe and report on the police activities.129 Those challenging media
intrusion would usually do so under tort theories, specifically trespass and
invasion of privacy.130 Therefore, when consent became an issue, it was not
analyzed in accordance with Schneckloth and other decisions that used the
Fourth Amendment.131 Instead it was analyzed in the context of being an
affirmative defense against actions of trespass.132 Where an individual
consented to the media’s presence it was typically viewed as a complete bar to
any subsequent actions of trespass.133
Determining whether consent had been obtained in trespass actions also
involved a much lesser degree of scrutiny by the courts.134 The potential
coercive atmosphere created by police presence and other factors considered
under the Fourth Amendment were not contemplated when dealing with
trespass actions.135 Additionally, the courts sought to determine whether the
media obtained consent to be present.136 This differs from Fourth Amendment
analysis since, in the latter, the court determines whether the police obtained
consent for the media to be present.137 This distinction is important since in
these prior decisions it was the media’s actions in obtaining consent that were
scrutinized rather than the actions of the police.
More recently, however, the courts have begun to recognize that when the
media did accompany the police into a home, they were doing so under a right
the police possessed.138 The police’s right to enter the home was created by
obtaining a warrant.139 As discussed, obtaining a warrant was generally seen as
necessary under the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.140
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment is implicated when the media accompany
the police or other government officials into a private residence under the
authority of a warrant.141 Wilson, in fact, now indicates this is the supreme law
of the land.142 The courts only needed to take one more step to make the
determination that the Fourth Amendment is also implicated when the media
accompany the police into a home under the guise of consent. Recent lower

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See cases cited supra note 128.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 128.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Berger, 129 F.3d at 513.
Wilson, 119 U.S. at 1697-98; Berger, 129 F.3d at 513; Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 685-86.
See cases cited supra note 138.
Id.
Id.
Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699.
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federal and state court decisions indicate that this final step of reasoning has
been taken.143
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Wilson Does Not Act as a Complete Bar to the Media Accompanying the
Police into the Home

It is conceded at the outset of this argument that Wilson is hardly the
scenario where consent of the homeowners for the media to enter is a feasible
option. Wilson involved the unannounced entry of the police into a home to
execute an arrest warrant on a fugitive.144 Before the homeowner had a chance
to do anything other than inquire why the strangers were in his house, law
enforcement officials were tackling him to the ground.145
Instead of discussing the fact that consent was obviously not obtained for
the media to be in the house, the Court simply held that the Fourth Amendment
is violated when the media accompany the police into a home for purposes not
justified by the warranted intrusion of the police.146 This holding, however,
should not be interpreted as preventing the police from attempting to obtain the
voluntary consent of the residents for the media to enter.
As discussed, many courts now implicate the Fourth Amendment when
they are analyzing an individual’s consent for the media to enter the home with
the police.147 This means that the factors set forth in Schneckloth and its
progeny are considered. What this also means, however, is that when a
consent is determined to be valid, the Fourth Amendment is viewed as being
waived.148 In other words, the Constitutional right that kept the media from
entering the home is voluntarily waived by the resident. So long as the consent
is freely and voluntarily given, the police cannot violate the Fourth
Amendment by bringing media into a home with them since the protection of
the Amendment has been waived.149
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the Fourth Amendment is
violated if the police enter a home absent probable cause and a warrant.150 The
143. See Berger 129 F.3d at 513; Robinson v. City and Cty. of Denver, 39 F. Supp.2d 1257,
1262 (D. Col. 1999); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp 703, 713-14 (N.D. Ohio
1997); Barett v. Outlet Broadcasting, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
144. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1695.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1698-99.
147. See cases cited supra note 143.
148. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235-37.
149. See id. It is understood that Schneckloth involved the search of an automobile and not
the media’s accompanying the police into a home. Schneckloth, however, is relied upon to
determine the validity of a consent in any situation where the Fourth Amendment is implicated.
150. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1692; Katz, 389 U.S. at 347; Payton, 445 U.S. at 573.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

146

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:129

Court has carved out a few narrow and well-delineated exceptions to this
Though factually dealing with automobile searches,
general rule.151
Schneckloth sets forth the basic principle that the valid consent of a resident for
the police to enter waives their Fourth Amendment right to keep the police out
of the home.152 This rationale is what allows the police to enter a home
without a warrant or even probable cause. As long as a valid consent is
obtained, there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment by law enforcement’s
subsequent entry into a home.153 The fact that Wilson holds the Fourth
Amendment is violated by the media accompanying the police into a home
while a warrant is executed is irrelevant when the police obtain a valid consent
for the media’s entry. The consenting individual has voluntarily waived the
protection the Constitution affords him and has freely and voluntarily chosen
to allow the media to accompany the police into his home.154
B.

Measuring Consent In a Way to Assure the Validity of a Waiver of a
Fourth Amendment Right

The validity of the consent obtained by police for the media to enter the
home must be in accordance with that standard used to measure the validity of
a consent to a warrantless search by the consenting individual. The plethora of
case law already discussed reveals a Fourth Amendment right to keep law
enforcement officials out of the home absent certain circumstances.155 Because
the police are entering the home pursuant to a warrant, Wilson indicates an
151. See cases cited supra note 143.
152. Id.
153. Id. This is not intended to suggest there is no Fourth Amendment violation if the officers
exceed the scope of the consent that they have been granted. There is ample authority holding
that when the police do exceed the consent they have obtained, the Fourth Amendment can still
be violated. See United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 87 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v.
Rudolph, 970 F.2d 467, 468 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 129 n.3
(7th Cir. 1971).
154. It is interesting to note the Court’s discussion of the point of view that a valid consent
can rarely be obtained, regardless of the circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247 (citing
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966)). These sentiments seem to stem from the
rationale that uniformed police officers, no matter how polite, create an automatic coercive
atmosphere in the eyes of the potential consenter. Some scholars have even cited to psychologist
Stanley Milgram and his obedience theories. Daniel L. Rotenberg, Symposium, An Essay On
Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U.L.Q. 175, 187-89 (Spr. 1991). These theories
hypothesize that instead of exercising free will, individuals are much more likely to submit to the
requests of a person in an authority position. Id. (citing S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY
(1974)). The submission, or consent, is not seen as an exercise of free will that is voluntarily
given, but simply as obedience to authority. Id.
155. See Berger, 129 F.3d at 513. As discussed, any entrance into the home must meet the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Implicit within this requirement is that
the police obtain a warrant based upon probable cause. This is essentially what justifies the
police entry into the home.
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invocation of the Fourth Amendment when the media enter the home under the
shield of the warrant the police obtained.156 Since the media’s purpose of
entering the home is in no way related to the justification the police have for
entering, Wilson holds that the Fourth Amendment is violated.157 In other
words, a person has a Fourth Amendment right to keep the media, or anyone
else the police bring along, out of the home when their presence is not
specifically justified by a warrant. Due to this invocation of the Fourth
Amendment by the media’s presence, when the police obtain consent for the
media to be present inside the home, the individual consenting is waiving this
Fourth Amendment right.158 Therefore, the court must conduct a Fourth
Amendment analysis of the media intrusion.
The most notable decision making such an analysis occurred in the Fourth
As previously discussed, the court
Circuit in Berger v. Hanlon.159
acknowledged that a law enforcement official obtained a valid consent to enter
a home.160 He did not obtain a valid consent, however, to permit the media to
“enter” the home via a hidden microphone transmitting in real time to a CNN
crew.161 This situation differs slightly from Wilson, since the officer was
entering the home without a warrant.162 What is stressed, however, is that the
court held the Fourth Amendment was violated since there was no valid
consent for the media to enter the home.163 The police, in a sense, exceeded
the scope of the consent they had obtained. The court, therefore, determined
that the homeowner had not waived his Fourth Amendment right to prohibit
the police from allowing the media to enter the home.

156. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699.
157. Id.
158. Id. See also cases cited supra notes 128. As mentioned, the courts traditionally used a
consent standard measured in the context of a trespass action when the media entered the home.
This is primarily because, prior to this decade, there were very few homeowners alleging Fourth
Amendment violations as a result of the media accompanying police into their home. Id. Instead,
the typical form of redress was in tort law. Homeowners would usually bring actions of trespass
or invasion of privacy when the media crossed the “threshold of the ruined tenement.” In
situations where the petitioners did claim Fourth Amendment violations it was often ignored or
the theory was rejected. Id. If any constitutional amendment was implicated it was usually the
First Amendment. Id. It was also usually used as a defense by the media, who claimed that they
had a First Amendment right resulting from an implied invitation to enter the home. In the past
decade, however, these theories have largely been abandoned. Id. This is primarily due to a host
of lower court decisions addressing the media’s entry into the home with the Fourth Amendment
rather than tort law. Id. Accordingly, the courts also started ushering in analysis that considered
whether this Fourth Amendment right had been waived with a valid consent. Id.
159. See Berger, 129 F.3d at 509-14.
160. Id. at 509.
161. Id. at 513.
162. Id. at 509.
163. Id. at 513-14
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This decision seems to impact consent analysis concerning media
intrusions in three distinct ways. First, this holding demonstrates the court’s
willingness and insistence that the issue of consent for the media’s entrance
implicates the Fourth Amendment.164 Second, is that the court scrutinized the
officer’s actions, and not the media’s, in obtaining consent to enter the home.
Citing Schneckloth, the court determined that the officer did not obtain a
consent that was freely and voluntarily given by the homeowner for the media
to enter.165 By deferring to Schneckloth, the court strongly implies it will
examine consent in accordance with this case and its progeny. Third, the court
also implies that if consent for the media to enter the home had been obtained,
there would have been no Fourth Amendment violation.166
Numerous lower court decisions both before and after Berger reveal this
same analysis being made. In U.S. v. Sanusi, a case factually similar to
Wilson, the court recognized that a news crew had “entered defendant’s home
without the consent of defendant or his family.” 167 By not obtaining consent,
the court observed that the media’s participation in the execution of a search
warrant was under color of official right and was contrary to the Fourth
Amendment.168
Though dealing with an action for trespass, in Reeves v. Fox the Federal
Court for the Northern District of Ohio followed an analysis similar to that
argued in this analysis.169 In Reeves, the police arrived at the plaintiff’s
(Reeves) home after learning of a physical altercation between plaintiff and
another man.170 The police then obtained consent to enter the home.171 A
camera crew from the television show COPS followed the police into the
home.172 The crew then videotaped the police encounter and subsequent arrest
of the plaintiff.173 Plaintiff then sought to argue that even if he had consented

164. Id. at 510-14.
165. Berger, 129 F.3d at 510-14.
166. Id. The police’s ability, despite Wilson, to continue bringing the media into the home as
long as consent is obtained, will be discussed further in the next section of this note.
167. 813 F. Supp. at 160. Sanusi is the district court setting for what later arose to the Second
Circuit as Ayeni. Babatunde Ayeni was one of the named defendants in the district court action.
The factual setting the district court encountered, was therefore, similar to that examined by the
Second Circuit.
168. Id. It is important to recognize that when the court spoke of consent, they spoke in terms
of the media obtaining that consent and not the police. Wilson, however, loosely implies that it is
the police who must obtain consent for the media to enter, since it is the police who are
authorized to enter. Also, though Sansuni involves a trespass action, the court counters with a
Fourth Amendment analysis. See supra notes 17-20.
169. 983 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
170. Id. at 707.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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to the media’s entry, it was done so under duress.174 Reeves stated that he was
under duress to consent to the media’s entry from the moment the police
entered the house.175
In response to this argument, the court addressed this as a “criminal law
enforcement context” stating “the court must review the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ to determine whether the consenting party’s consent was
voluntary or was the product of duress.”176 The court then went on to consider
a variety of factors considered by Schneckloth and its progeny.177 The court
noted there was no physical contact or verbal force and that plaintiff had had
several previous encounters with the police that resulted in arrest.178 The court
also brought attention to the fact that the police did not threaten any
consequences if Reeves did not consent, that Reeves was aware of his right to
deny their entry, and that Reeves made no objections to either the police or
media’s entry.179 The court, therefore, held that the consent was freely and
voluntarily given.180 Though the Reeves Court should be commended for their
Schneckloth analysis, it will later be argued in this paper that their final
decision of a valid consent was probably incorrect.
Later in the same year, the Federal Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
in Barrett v. Outlet Broadcasting, Inc. followed the lead of its northern
neighbor.181 In Barrett, the police were responding to a 911 suicide call at a
private residence.182 When they arrived, they brought with them a news crew,
which subsequently entered the home. The news crew eventually made its way
upstairs to where the body was located and filmed the suicide victim.183 Later,
it was contended by the family of the decedent that her Fourth Amendment
rights were violated since the media did not have consent to enter the home;
and even if they did have consent to enter the home, the plaintiff argued they
did not have consent to venture upstairs and film the body.184
In responding to this contention concerning the media’s unconsented to
entry, the court conducted a Fourth Amendment consent analysis.185 Citing
Schneckloth, the court stated, “[c]onsent is an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”186 The court went on to examine the
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Reeves, 983 F. Supp. at 713.
Id. at 713-14.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 713-14.
Id. at 714.
Id.
Reeves, 983 F. Supp. at 714.
22 F. Supp.2d. 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id.
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scope of the consent the media may have been granted. Citing Florida v.
Jimeno the court stated that the “scope of consent is that which a typical
reasonable person would understand from the exchange between the
government and the person who gave consent.187 The court went on to hold
that a reasonable jury could find that allowing a news crew to “come in” does
not include permission to go upstairs and film a victim; and therefore a valid
consent was not obtained.188
Like the decision in Reeves, the court analyzes consent in a criminal
context, which implicates the Fourth Amendment rights of the homeowner.
The court then relies on Schneckloth to determine if that Fourth Amendment
right has been adequately waived by a valid consent.
An even more recent district court decision further demonstrates this mode
of analysis. In Robinson v. Denver the police were entering a home pursuant
to an arrest warrant.189 Like Reeves, the media followed the police into the
home and then filmed the arrest.190 In Robinson, however, the plaintiff did not
consent to the media’s entry into the home and, in fact, specifically objected to
their presence.191 Similar to Wilson, the court held that the police had
exceeded the scope of their arrest warrant by allowing the media into the home
and, therefore, violated the Fourth Amendment.192 Though the court did not
give any analysis of Schneckloth or other consent factors, as it was obvious
that no consent was given, this decision has much the same implications as
Berger. Noting that no consent was given implies that when a valid consent is
obtained for the media to enter the home, no violation of the Fourth
Amendment occurs. The court goes on to state that “absent justification. . . for
the intrusion consistent with the Fourth Amendment, such behavior clearly
exceeds the scope of the arrest warrant.”193 A logical extrapolation of this
statement, however, indicates any justification for intrusion must also be
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. When consent is the justification, it
must therefore be analyzed within the context of the Fourth Amendment. This
requires making a Schneckloth analysis of the consent.
C. The Pervasiveness of Consent Searches
Consent searches are the most common form of searches conducted by the
police. It is, in fact, estimated that ninety-eight percent of searches are
conducted pursuant to a consent and not a warrant.194 Although most consent
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Barrett, 22 F. Supp.2d at 739 (citing 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).
Id.
39 F. Supp.2d 1257, 1262 (D.Colo. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1265.
Robinson, 39 F. Supp.2d at 1265.
See supra note 89.
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searches occur away from the home, in automobiles or on the person, it is still
a popular method utilized by law enforcement to gain entrance into the home.
Decisions such as Schneckloth have only affirmed this police practice by
stating that as long as the consent is freely and voluntarily given, the police are
not violating any Fourth Amendment right. Despite Wilson, it seems likely
that this form of authorized intrusion will be extended by the police as a means
to continue to permit the media to enter a home with them.
Law enforcement has continually insisted that they have a strong interest in
allowing the media to accompany them into a home during an arrest or search
warrant.195 Police claim that they have an interest in demonstrating to the
public their combative efforts at fighting crime. The popularity of shows such
as COPS makes this contention hard to rebut. This assertion was even used in
Wilson as an attempt to justify the media’s presence in the home.196 Although
the Court rejected the argument, it did acknowledge the importance of the
public being informed about the administration of criminal justice.197
It has also been argued that the media’s presence will result in more
accurate reporting.198 Along with this is a video documentation of the police’s
execution of the warrant. It could potentially benefit law enforcement officials
to have such documentation available should there be subsequent claims that
the warrant was executed improperly. These arguments were also posed and
rejected in Wilson due to the Court’s determination that police could provide
their own “quality control” techniques without the media’s presence.199
This note does not argue that the Court should have accepted such
justifications to allow the media’s presence in the home. Rather, these
attempted justifications are mentioned to demonstrate law enforcement’s
strong desire to continue to publicize and popularize their work in the field. In
the eyes of law enforcement, such publicizing of their work provides a more
positive view of their efforts, while at the same time creating negative feelings
towards the evils they are fighting against.200
If there is a way around Wilson, the police are obviously going to take
advantage of it since they have expressed the strong desire to bring the media
along with them. Fortunately for the police, Wilson uses the Fourth
Amendment to protect the homeowner’s right to keep the media out of the
home.201 As previously discussed, there has long existed a generally accepted

195. See defendant’s arguments in Wilson, supra notes 81-82; Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686; Berger,
129 F.3d at 513-14.
196. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697-98.
197. Id. at 1698.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1699.
200. Id. at 1697-99.
201. Id. at 1699.
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way around the Fourth Amendment.202 It follows, therefore, that there is a way
around Wilson. Just obtain the consent of the homeowner, and whether the
consenting individual knows it or not, he could be waiving his Fourth
Amendment protections. The police will certainly take advantage of this
“loop-hole” to continue their efforts to publicize their efforts to fight crime.
D. The Invalidity of Most Consents For the Media to Enter
Before police officers start rehearsing their uncoercive requests to bring
the media into the home, they should be aware that a valid consent will be
virtually impossible to obtain in most situations involving the execution of a
warrant. As discussed, a consent must be freely and voluntarily given, and
must be free from police coercion.203 A variety of other factors have also been
recognized by the Court to determine if this consent was actually free from
coercion.204 When police arrive at the doorstep of the home, or force their way
into the home, a coercive atmosphere is often automatically created.205 This
precludes the existence of any potentially valid consent that would otherwise
allow the media to enter the home with the police.206
This can best be demonstrated during the execution of an arrest warrant.
In Wilson, for instance, the police forcefully entered the home and immediately
took the homeowner into custody.207 Though the media had already entered,
even if they had waited outside for the police to obtain consent, a valid consent
could not have been obtained. It is important to remember that consent for the
media’s presence in the home is being analyzed in accordance with
Schneckloth and subsequent Fourth Amendment cases.208 As such, any
consent to further requests made by a person who has been forcefully taken
into custody will likely be viewed as invalid in light of all the circumstances.209
The fact that many situations do not even require the police to knock before
entering the home to execute an arrest warrant further supports this contention
regarding the coercive nature of such circumstances.210

202. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 218. This “way around the Fourth Amendment” is
referencing the valid consent enunciated in Schneckloth.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 543.
206. Id.
207. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1695.
208. See id. at 1699.
209. Id.
210. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 386 (1997). The Court considers a no-knock entry
as justified when the police have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their
presence before entering would be dangerous or futile or doing the same would inhibit an
effective investigation of the crime.
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This rationale also applies when the police arrive to execute a search
warrant. Although consents are routinely obtained to search a home when
there is no probable cause or even a warrant, when the police arrive with a
warrant a different scenario is created. In the former circumstance, the resident
has a right to refuse the police’s entry due to the lack of a warrant or even
probable cause.211 In the latter circumstance, when the police arrive with a
search warrant, they are essentially saying they are going to enter your home
and conduct a search. The owner has no right of refusal. The reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is assumed to be satisfied by the
issuance of the warrant.
It is important to notice a difference in the intensity of the coercive
atmosphere created in each situation. When the police arrive without a warrant
or probable cause they must ask to enter the home.212 This cannot be done by
threats, intimidation, etc.213 There is also the homeowner’s right to reject their
request. When the police arrive with a warrant, however, they assert that they
are going to enter the home. The resident has no choice but to submit to the
police requests.
When the police arrive with a search or arrest warrant, the coercive nature
of their presence greatly increases. As the setting in Wilson demonstrates, it
would be under this heightened degree of coerciveness that the police must
obtain a valid consent for the media to enter the home. Though consent history
indicates that the totality of the circumstances is considered, and this coercive
atmosphere created by the warrant might only be one factor, this factor seems
to carry enough coercive weight to make the consent invalid. Even in light of
the Court’s consideration of the resident’s intelligence, age, awareness of his or
her right to refuse the media’s entrance, etc., the defectiveness of the consent
seems to persist.214 It seems, therefore, that if the Court adheres to its
Schneckloth analysis, a valid consent for the media to accompany the police
during the execution of search or arrest warrants will be extremely difficult to
obtain.
V. CONCLUSION
The Wilson decision establishes that law enforcement officials violate the
Fourth Amendment when they permit media to accompany them inside a home
during the execution of a warrant for purposes not specifically related to the

211. See supra text accompanying note 153. Though residents may have the right to not
consent, critics of the consent exception see it as useless due to most people’s seemingly innate
submissions to authority figures.
212. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 573.
213. See supra text accompanying note 117. Threatening to obtain a warrant will not vitiate
the consent, however, if the police have genuine reasons to obtain a warrant. Id.
214. See cases cited supra note 111.
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officials’ justified intrusion. Wilson does not clearly establish, however, that a
Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the media enter the home pursuant
to a valid consent obtained by the officers. To measure the validity of this
consent, the same standard used to measure the validity of a consent during a
warrantless search, Schneckloth’s totality of the circumstances, should be
utilized.
Given the extensive use of consent searches by law enforcement, it is
likely that police officials will attempt to extend this warrantless method of
entering the home to situations where a warrant does exist to enter the home,
but does not specifically allow the media to enter and observe the activities.
The officers will simply attempt to obtain the consent of the homeowner for
the media to enter. Such consents will rarely be valid, however, due to the
increased coercive atmosphere that usually occurs when the police are
executing a warrant. Until there is a Court decision speaking more clearly on
the issue, however, Wilson is not likely going to keep the police from bringing
the media into the home through this “consent” method.
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